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Summary 
The existence of a Catholic Intellectual Tradition (CIT) is not a given, as arguments contra are in 
balance with arguments pro. An intellectual tradition consists of a style of thought and of a 
worldview, as its formal and material modes. The former defines the way knowledge is 
appropriated, processed, and passed on whereas the latter amounts to its applications to various 
regions of reality – God, man, morality, society, the Church, etc.  A model of the CIT is proposed 
that consists of principles differentiated by the degree of centrality they have in a topological 
structure. The paper asserts the existence of a CIT because a non-stipulative, non-trivial, and non-
circular case can be made for it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
The existence of a Catholic Intellectual Tradition (CIT) is often taken for granted. However, there 
are reasons for questioning its usefulness as an explanatory concept. It is in any case not an 
unproblematic assumption, and one that is of rather recent vintage. In order for a CIT to be assumed 
in an unambiguous way that is not based on triviality, mere stipulation, or circular reasoning, it 
needs to undergo rational reconstruction. The CIT shares this, of course, with other classificatory 
concepts of intellectual and cultural history such as Gnosticism, the Renaissance, the 
Enlightenment, or Romanticism.  
In the following the reasons for doubting the existence of a CIT shall first be considered, both as a 
useful explanatory concept and a real historical structure (2.). Conditions for an intellectual and 
cultural tradition will then be presented that are grounded in the philosophy of science and the 
sociology of knowledge (3.). This model will be applied to the CIT to reveal its structure, both in a 
static (synchronic) and a dynamic (diachronic) perspective (4). Lastly, the question of the existence 
of a CIT can be answered with more authority than by mere fiat (5). 
The reasoning presents a summary of a larger work in progress that seeks to spell out the principles 
on which the CIT rests and to investigate its structure (Grassl 2010). It should be clear that in this 
discourse, as in intellectual history in general, ideal types are sometimes unavoidable even though 
an attempt at precision by necessary and sufficient conditions is made. Since ideas are ontologically 
fuzzier than chemical compounds or biological species, any axiomatization of intellectual traditions 
has so far proven elusive. Although recent work on the scientific status of theology leads in this 
direction (McGrath 2004), theology as a discipline defies precision (as do philology, sociology, or 
geology) whereas particular traditions within theology might be understood as theories that have 
developed out of religious visions and then been refined over time. Whereas the philosophy of 
science has produced a very comprehensive literature on the structure of scientific theories, the 
structure of intellectual traditions, which are much less circumscript and well-defined, has received 
little clarification. But this should not serve as an excuse not to abide by Quine’s dictum, “There is 
no entity without identity.” Claiming the existence of an object makes sense “only insofar as we 
have an acceptable principle of individuation for that sort of object” (Quine 1981: 102). If this is 
understood as requiring that criteria can be defined for counting an entity towards the class or type 
of entities to which it is assumed to belong, the existence of a CIT depends on how an intellectual 
tradition is understood.  
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2.  Why There May Not Be a Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
It is easy to find reasons against the assumption that a CIT really exists or can be readily defined: 
(1) The term itself is of recent vintage. It has been coined no earlier than in the late 1980’s in the 
United States (with only a few unrelated occurrences before that), where Catholic colleges and 
universities were engaged in searches of their identity. For this purpose, American Catholics alleged 
– and perhaps hypostatized – the existence of an intellectual tradition, as a historical construct on 
which to build identity claims. The CIT was in a diffuse sense to be broader than Catholic 
dogmatics or any particular system such as Thomism though no attempt has been made to delineate 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the term. 
(2) The term has remained limited to intra-American usage. Searches in major library catalogs and 
in twenty-one major languages on the Internet using the search engines Google, Google Scholar, 
and Google Books have revealed nearly no results that were not in English and particularly not from 
the United States. No document issued by a pope or a dicastery of the Roman Curia, including the 
numerous pronouncements on philosophy or education, has ever used the phrase in Latin or in 
translation.  
(3) The terminus a quo of a CIT is unclear. Did it start with the Great Schism (1054) or the 
Protestant Reformation (1517), before which it may have been identical with the more general 
Christian tradition? Is it then a product of the Council of Trent, or of the Counterreformation? 
Jaroslav Pelikan entitled the first volume of his five-volume series on The Christian Tradition, for 
the period 100-600 AD, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (1971). While he emphasized the 
development of the Church Catholic, he certainly did not regard 600 AD as its terminus ad quem. 
Might the concept be so unhistorical, because it refers to a set of intellectual dispositions, that it can 
apply to thinkers of any era, location, and perhaps faith? 
(4) Definition by members seems impossible. The mere fact of membership in the Catholic Church 
is not a sufficient and may not even be a necessary condition. Intellectual traditions such as 
Romanticism or expressionism can all be defined by shared beliefs rather than adherents.  
(5) Lastly, its part-whole structure may be the greatest challenge. In what sense is the CIT different 
from the deposit of faith as formulated by the Magisterium? How does the CIT relate to other 
“regional” traditions such as the Catholic Dogmatic Tradition, the Catholic Social Tradition, the 
Catholic Moral Tradition, and the Catholic Liturgical Tradition? How do partial intra-Catholic 
traditions such as those of Augustinianism, Thomism, Suarezianism, or the intellectual traditions of 
various religious orders, fit into a coherent picture? And is a definition of the CIT strong enough to 
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account for the possible existence of a “Catholic philosophy,” “Catholic art,” or “Catholic 
literature” defined by material criteria rather than by the faith of their creators? 
These issues suggest that, even if a CIT can be claimed to exist, its mode of existence is far from 
clear. It has not been defined with sufficient precision to be a useful term in academic discourse. 
Most research on Catholicism finds the term dispensable, and eschews equally ambiguous 
synonyms such as “Catholic thought” (Dawson) or “Catholic imagination” (Tracy, Greeley). 
Invocation of “standing in the CIT,” particularly by colleges or universities, seems to facilitate 
avoiding commitment to being Catholic tout court. The term may then be understood as simply an 
American mental fiction, a constructed tradition like Thanksgiving or the supposedly continuous 
“liberal arts” tradition invented by American educators (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: 279f.). And 
it has indeed been regarded as invented (Tilley 2000). Countries where Catholics are in the majority 
and culture has been strongly impregnated by the religion despite recent secularization simply take 
a Catholic style of thought for granted. In the Protestant cultural sphere, however, and specifically 
in the United States, a CIT has been hypostatized as a counterproposal to the Protestant intellectual 
majority to which Catholic thought has yet willingly assimilated. The primary use of the term seems 
to be apologetic, as convenient shorthand for something one cannot quite define, and often as a 
substitute for “Catholic.”  
These arguments amount to a case for deconstructing the CIT. The alternative to it is undertaking an 
attempt at rational reconstruction.     
 
3.  What Intellectual Traditions Are 
Intellectual (and cultural) traditions share a number of features: (1) They are more comprehensive 
than a theory, since they may themselves contain theories. (2) They are abstract systems of 
propositions embodied in concrete individuals constituting a society or culture. (3) They have a 
holistic (or at least “molecular”) structure, i.e., no proposition stands in isolation from any other; 
whereas the degree of centrality of propositions within a tradition may vary, adherents must accept 
a tradition as a whole or else reject it. (4) Their boundaries (and often even the existence) of a 
tradition are only known ex post facto. (5) Their boundaries are generally fuzzy rather than well-
defined. (6) They are inherently of a social nature, with its bearers being an integral part of the 
tradition. (7) They have institutions for their own correction and propagation. (8) They are wholes 
that allow for different parts as sub-traditions. (9) If they are based on religion, they comprise not 
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only propositional content but also practical and tacit knowledge (such as liturgical practices and 
religious customs) (Geiselmann 1966: 84-90).  
These conditions on intellectual traditions derive from various sources, but there is a surprising 
agreement on them across historical and epistemological divides. Thus Lovejoy, Guardini, Pieper, 
and Quine have sustained the holistic, network-like structure of theories and traditions. Michael 
Polányi, Wittgenstein, MacIntyre, and Lovejoy have emphasized that they rely on implicit 
assumptions, unconscious mental habits, or tacit knowledge, operating in the thought of individuals 
or groups. Wittgenstein, Lovejoy, Guardini, Pieper, Mannheim, and most sociologists of 
knowledge, have claimed their comprehensive reach, i.e. a power “to influence the course of man’s 
reflections on almost any subject” (Lovejoy 1936: 10).  
In formal notation, an intellectual traditio m d as a quintuple n ay then be represente
ञ = < च, ൏ झ ่ ड ൐ ൐ ऍ, ऒ, 
where ऍ = the community of knowers of ञ; ऒ = the host society or culture for ञ;  च = the practices 
admissible in ञ; झ = the style of thought employed in ञ; and ड = the worldview underlying ञ. ऍ 
accounts for the “embodiment” of the tradition in its propagators, including its institutional 
structures such as the visible Church, and ऒ for its enculturation, explaining why certain cultures 
are more receptive to a tradition than others. It has been suggested that traditions are as much 
prescriptions for practices and actions as they are sets of propositions (Gracia 2003). In the arts, this 
means a style of painting or of composing. In traditions based on a religion, this means a style of 
worshipping.  च is therefore particularly important for religious traditions, for it comprises liturgy, 
rituals, and symbolism, which have been regarded an integral part of the CIT. Since a tradition is 
represented as an ordered set of components, there is an internal structure to it. For example, a 
refined version of ञ could account for the higher propensity by a particular society or culture to 
develop or ac  particular style of thought or worldview.  cept a
The pair < झ ่ ड > may be understood as the core of  ञ, where this core consists of propositions 
(here called “principles”) that define the historical identity of ञ. This means that an intellectual 
tradition consists of a style of thought and of a worldview, as the formal and material modes of its 
existence. A style of thought, as a mental model, defines the way knowledge is appropriated, 
processed, and passed on whereas a worldview is constituted by the set of applications of a style of 
thought to various regions of reality such as God, man, morality, society, the Church, etc. A style of 
thought comprises the principles of how Catholics typically think, a worldview the principles of 
what they think. ड  is largely the deposit of faith (παραθήκη) that is repeatedly referenced in 
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scripture (1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:12, 14).  झ can exist independently, but ड cannot; it depends on the 
application of formal principles to a material domain. The traditions of Catholic moral theology or 
of Catholic social thought are the applications to material domains of the principles of the Catholic 
style of thought: {झ} ่ moral decisions; ሼझሽ ่ social decisions. For the continuity of a tradition, a 
coherent style of thought is more crucial than a particular worldview. In the language of intellectual 
history, a traditio itself is represented by the quintuple whereas the tradita are the style of thought 
and how the community applies them to form a worldview. But constitutive of traditio is the mode 
of how Catholics typically see the world, for example in terms of integrated structures rather than 
individual parts, and from this it follows that they tend to see society as an organic whole. 
The component of a tradition that can most readily be compared to a theory in a scientific sense, i.e. 
to a logically consistent and interconnected set of propositions about one domain, is झ. Some 
philosophers and theologians have indeed regarded Catholicism as a kind of theory (McGrath 2003: 
24ff.; Haldane 2004: 48). Not all theories, for example in mathematics, computer science, 
cosmology, or rational mechanics, have an empirical content. Distinguishing an abstract structure 
from its intended applications is a conception of theories that (under the name “non-statement 
view”) is now widely used in the philosophy of science (Ruttkamp 2002: ch. 4). It does not view 
theories as deductively closed axiomatized sets of statements but as abstract mathematical structures 
that find their empirical instantiation in intended applications. Reality is not imported into the 
theory through its theoretical language, but the abstract structure is applied to regions of reality 
much as the formal principles of Catholic thought (झ) are applied, for example, to the social domain 
to produce the principles of Catholic Social Thought. Theories refer to outside reality and explain it 
through models (Giere 1988: 82ff.). In this view, the core of a theory remains constant over time; its 
structure is invariant but the regions of reality to which it is applied – its intended applications ड – 
may certainly expand. The Catholic style of thought can be applied to education, art history, 
international relations, or plant genetics, among other fields. But its principles, which are lastly 
grounded in religious truth, have been remarkably constant over history. The understanding of what 
persons are, and when actions are morally justified, has not changed much in the course of the CIT; 
but in vitro fertilization or physician-assisted suicide are issues that have arisen only recently, and 
the application of the same principles to new instances is then a case of developing the tradition 
through expanding on the Catholic worldview (Grassl 2009).  
The trend in the philosophy of science, under the structuralist paradigm (or the “non-statement 
view”), to regard theories as abstract mathematical structures seeking empirical applications had its 
precursor in Aquinas’ claim that in every science one can distinguish between the things themselves 
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which are studied – the raw material of the science (or its “material object”) – and the point of view, 
or aspect from which they are considered (or its “formal object”). For Aquinas, the diversity of the 
sciences is established by the diversity of aspects under which things can be known, or by their 
formal objects: diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit (ST I, q.1, a.1). 
Furthermore, “the unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not in its material aspect, 
but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object” (ST I-II, q.1, a.3). Based on this 
distinction, in Christian theology, a formal principle is the authority which forms or shapes the 
doctrinal system of a religion or tradition. Thus the Catholic style of thought logically precedes a 
Catholic worldview (Scheffczyk 2008). Even partial Catholic traditions – such as Augustinianism 
and Thomism – are differentiated more by their underlying ontology and epistemology, particularly 
their different views on the sources of faith, than by their dogmatic or moral theologies. But the 
style of thought would hardly have been passed on over two millennia had it not been applied to an 
understanding of the world and its history; it is a mistake to reduce the CIT to it (Miller 2002). 
 
4.  The Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
The style of thought typical of the CIT comprises principles such as the following (where this list of 
nine principles is certainly non-exhaustive) (Grassl 2010): 
Designation Explanation Implications 
Vita sacra Reality is ordered towards God, who lets us participate in His reality. 
Signs do not only signify but also bring 
about real change. 
Ordo rerum Objectivism and realism: “sovereignty of the object” (Kolnai). 
All domains of reality have an intrinsic 
order; anti-reductionism. 
Gradatio Gradualism: both physical and moral reality is continuous rather than discrete. 
There are degrees of reality; intermediate 
structures; multi-layered ontology. 
Agere sequitur esse Practical reasoning is determined by the nature of things, not by volition alone. 
There is no “is-ought problem”; positive 
and normative science are not separate. 
Analogia entis Ability to infer the nature of the creator from the structure of creation. 
“Grace perfects nature; it does not destroy 
it” (Aquinas). Embrace of the imperfect. 
Adaequatio rei et 
intellectus 
Realist understanding of truth as a 
correspondence between mind and reality. 
The human mind is capable of attaining 
truth; anti-relativism. 
Sic et non Coexistence of apparently opposing positions: “additive thought” (Newman). 
Avoids apodictic oppositions (contradicto-
ries) in favor of contraries or synthesis. 
Integratio All knowledge (and faith) is a single and integrated whole. 
Denies departmentalization of knowledge; 
epistemological holism. 
Fides et ratio Continuity of faith and reason: rational apprehension of faith.  
Natural ability to know God; faith is not 
only a function of grace. 
These principles were selected through content analysis of the writings of twenty Catholic 
theologians (Grassl 2010). At the center of the Catholic style of thought, one may see the principle 
of sacramentality – the propensity to see God in all things (St. Ignatius) and to understand specific 
signs as vehicles of grace. All other principles are corollaries required by a realist understanding of 
sacramentality – three ontological assumptions and five epistemological assumptions. Sacraments 
are only conceivable in a realistic sense if physical signs and performances not only point toward a 
transcendent reality but bring it to bear upon humans through grace. There must then exist an 
ordered reality independently of any human subjectivity, and any human action in the world must 
be made with a view to the structure of this reality. And knowledge of this structure is, in principle, 
possible, since the human mind is attuned to its cognition. The distinction if not division between 
ontological and epistemological claims is itself a trait of the philosophical realism that is 
characteristic of the CIT – the priority of ontology over epistemology (Grassl 2010).  
In a synchronic model, the CIT can then be envisaged as a topological structure, or as a network of 
principles with a core ൏ झ ่ ड ൐ consisting of the Catholic style of thought and its worldview. 
The principle of sacramentality will be at the center of the style of thought: 
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Christian thought has derived from Greek philosophy a distinction between different dimensions of 
reality. The Catholic style of thought here applies to the domain of the natural (Physis), of the social 
and cultural (Nomos), and of the spiritual and religious (Logos). Other classifications could of 
course be chosen. These applications are the interfaces to various Catholic traditions for which this 
distinctive style of thought of the CIT is the core, for example traditions in ethics, social thought, 
dogmatic theology, or liturgy. They all add up to the CIT. 
Representation of the CIT as a network structure has several advantages: (1) Relations between 
propositions (e.g., one-sided or two-sided dependence, or implication) can be shown; some will be 
closer to certain others. (2) The relative importance of propositions can be represented by the size of 
nodes. (3) If propositions can be described by parametric data, topological notions such as 
centrality, homogeneity, compactness, connectedness, integration, or closure can be applied to 
describe the structure of the core. For example, it should be possible to determine whether, as has 
been argued, Augustinian thought from St. Augustine to Balthasar is indeed a more integrated 
intellectual body that works with fewer postulates than is Thomistic thought, which is fraught with 
assumptions derived from Aristotelian metaphysics about being, existence, form, substance, 
potency, act, etc.  
The synchronic representation can then be extended to a diachronic one by showing which 
principles change over time, either through growth in relative importance, or through a semantic 
merger or separation. Network representations of intellectual traditions have of course become 
commonplace in the history of thought (Collins 1998); but they have at their nodes individual 
thinkers, not their thoughts. Congar has argued that a tradition may be developed, but not altered, 
and this is certainly the view of the Magisterium (Congar 1966). Since the intellectual style of the 
CIT is highly path-dependent, and can at most be nuanced, development occurs in the worldview, 
by applying the same principles to an understanding of new domains of reality, or by adding to 
these principles others imported from outside the CIT. By drawing on theory dynamics in science 
and in other intellectual enterprises such as the arts, the conditions explaining the coexistence of 
stability and change can be worked out.  
As a merely partial example, consider the development of Analytical Thomism and Transcendental 
Thomism. The latter stands in the lines of two others, theologically and philosophically in that of 
Thomistic thought and philosophically in that of philosophical idealism. However, the level at 
which borrowing occurs is of crucial importance. From Aquinas a basically realistic ontology was 
inherited, and from the tradition of idealist philosophy an epistemological approach, viz. Kant’s 
transcendental principle. Borrowing occurs always from a lower level (n-x) of another tradition, and 
the borrowed elements are then integrated into a higher level (n+x): 
 
               
   
Level  Intellectual Tradition1 
n‐1  Western Philosophy 
n  Logico‐Linguistic Analysis 
n+1  Frege, Russell, Carnap,  
Quine 
 
  Level  Intellectual Sub‐Tradition 
  n‐1  Christian 
n  Catholic 
n+1  Thomistic 
n+2  Analytical Thomism 
n+3  Geach, Haldane, ... 
   
Analytical 
             
Realist ontology
Level  Intellectual Tradition2 
n‐1  Western Philosophy 
n  Philosophical Realism 
n+1  Aristotle, Aquinas 
 
   
 
Level 
 
 
Intellectual Sub‐Tradition 
  n‐1  Christian 
n  Catholic 
n+1  Thomistic 
n+2  Transcendental Thomism 
n+3  Maréchal, Rahner, de  
Lubac, Lonergan, … 
Realist ontology
Transcendental 
principle
Level  Intellectual Tradition3 
n‐1  Western Philosophy 
n  Philosophical Idealism 
n+1  Kant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Catholic style of thought sees the world as a structured and multi-layered whole. But there also 
appears to be structure and regularity in the development of the CIT. An account of its dynamics 
rich in explanatory power must of course not only consider its core of principles but also the 
community of knowers, the societies and cultures facilitating and supporting it, and lastly its non-
propositional content, particularly the practices and customs correlated with it. It must explain why, 
for example, the CIT could thrive in some cultures more than in others, regardless of the number of 
Catholics. And it must explain why religious orders of a particular theological pedigree have 
developed differently in some societies than in others, even where all had Catholic population 
majorities (Grassl 2010a). 
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5.  Conclusion 
Much talk about a CIT is ambiguous, confusing, or simply stipulative. In many cases it involves 
reification, particularly when inferring from the thought of individuals connected by faith to the 
existence of an intellectual tradition. But a rational reconstruction of what the CIT is that avoids 
these pitfalls appears possible. Instead of attempting to define it by enumeration of representatives, 
it can be defined by a set of formal principles the application of which is necessary (and perhaps 
sufficient) for someone to count not as a Catholic but as a Catholic thinker. Such persons will apply 
this style of thought to all areas of reality they seriously consider, and thus develop a Catholic 
worldview. Formally, the style of thought, together with its specific applications, is a network of 
principles which may be envisaged as a topological structure in which each has a particular 
location, stands in relations to others, and upholds the robustness of the whole. Such principles and 
their relative weight can be ascertained by using quantitative and qualitative research tools. Thus 
the CIT has become “quantized” while still being an interconnected web. 
The conclusion is that a CIT actually exists, has been handed down, and has a particular structure. It 
need not, and indeed could not, be “constructed” (Tilley 2000). One can trace the genealogy of its 
principles – “unit-ideas” in Lovejoy’s sense – and show their consistency and continuity over time. 
The model presented rests of course on certain essentialist assumptions, for the widely 
acknowledged stability of the Catholic style of thought could not be explained if not through the 
reasonableness, coherence, and practical usefulness of its principles. The CIT is therefore not a 
“narrative” that could be “spun” in any direction one chooses. It is rather the core of that 
“hermeneutic of continuity” which Benedict XVI has repeatedly presented as constitutive of 
Catholic tradition (Caritas in Veritate, c. 12). 
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